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ABSTRACT 3
This	 paper	 theoretically	 analyzes	 two	 alternative	 modes	 of	 home	 financing.	 The	
first	mode	is	 the	conventional	housing	loan	and	the	other	 is	Enhanced	Musharakah	
Mutanaqisah	 (EMM)	 home	 financing.	 Our	 results	 reveal	 the	 EMM	 based	 setting	
is superior to the conventional housing loans in at least two aspects. These are the 
prevention	of	house	price	inflation	in	all	phases	of	economic	business	cycle	and	the	
smoothening of real estate cycles. This means that, under the EMM, the risk of real 
estate bubble formation is subdued, which should prove to be welfare improving.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The	global	collapse	of	real	estate	(RE)	markets	following	the	2007-2008	Subprime	
crisis	exposes	some	significant	flaws	of	conventional	home	financing.	Among	many	
flaws,	the	conventional	home	financing	is	speculative	in	nature	and	is	embedded	
with overshooting mechanism, features that make it fragile and vulnerable to 
financial	 and	 economic	 turmoil.	 Many	 argue	 that	 the	 ills	 of	 the	 conventional	
system	are	absent	in	the	Islamic	financing	alternative4. Unfortunately, there are not 
many	theoretical	works	to	back	this	argument	in	case	of	home	financing.	In	this	
paper, we formulate two theoretical models based on the conventional housing 
loan and the Enhanced Musharakah Mutanaqisah5 (EMM)	home	financing,	and	
compare their expected impacts on real estate prices. 
Musharakah	Mutanaqisah	home	financing	is	viewed	as	a	better	Islamic	home	
financing	alternative	to	existing	Islamic	financing	products	such	as	Bai’ Bithaman 
Ajil (BBA) in Southeast Asia and Murabahah in the Middle East. However, because 
of its resemblance to the conventional loan in the payment structure and its 
benchmarking to interest rates, most of the currently applied versions of MM home 
financing	are	criticized	as	being	an	Islamic	replica	of	the	conventional	mortgage.	
Thus,	from	a	purely	economic	point	of	view,	the	effect	of	the	contemporary	MM	
home	financings	on	real	estate	cycles	should	not	be	much	different	from	that	of	the	
conventional housing loan. 
As an alternative, we propose the Enhanced version of MM (EMM) home 
financing.	We	conjecture	that,	if	adopted,	its	impact	on	the	stability	of	the	real	estate	
(RE)	markets	and	the	economy	should	be	markedly	different.	The	main	distinctive	
features of the proposed EMM are its use of housing rents for the calculation of 
the rental revenue and sharing of capital gains or losses during ownership transfer 
from	banks	to	customers.	We	argue	that,	under	the	EMM	setting,	the	demand	for	
home	financing	will	be	influenced	by	the	changes	in	actual	economic	conditions	
rather	than	interest	rates	determined	in	financial	markets.	
One	way	how	the	EMM	home	financing	impacts	the	economy	is	as	follows.	If	
bank	revenue	from	home	financing	is	based	on	relatively	constant	housing	rents,	
home	financing	is	an	unattractive	investment	for	Islamic	banks	(IBs)	at	times	when	
the	price	of	housing	appreciates.	The	 reason	 is,	 by	 reducing	 rent-to-price	 ratio,	
the	 rate	 of	 return	 from	home	financing	drops.	 Thus,	 during	 real	 estate	 booms,	
IBs	will	curtail	home	financing	and	consequently	lower	the	demand	for	housing	
and stabilize RE markets. The opposite is expected if housing is undervalued. In 
such	a	case,	home	financing	becomes	an	attractive	investment	because	of	relatively	
higher	rent-to-price	ratio.	Therefore,	IBs	will	allocate	more	funds	for	it,	which	will	
increase demand for housing and consequently correct its price upwards. 
Additionally, since both parties to the EMM must share capital gain or loss 
of the property under transaction in line with the prescription of the Shari’ah, 
4. For some examples of such arguments, one can look at the works by Hassan & Kayed 
(2009), Iqbal & Mirakhor (2011) and Chapra (2011). 
5.	Musharakah	Mutanaqisah	 (MM)	 is	 a	mode	of	 Islamic	financing,	where	bank	and	
client	 enter	 into	 a	 contract	 of	 joint	 property	 ownership.	 Throughout	 the	 financing	
period, the client will rent banks share in the property and increase his ownership 
through gradual acquisition of bank’s share through payment of periodic instalments.
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the	financing	behavior	of	 Islamic	banks	using	such	a	mode	of	financing	will	be	
counter-cyclical.	 This	 should	 contribute	 towards	 smoothening	 of	 the	 RE	 cycle.	
There are several reasons for such supposition. During economic boom, which 
usually corresponds to real estate price acceleration, Islamic banks adopting the 
EMM	home	financing	would	reduce	home	financing	 to	avoid	any	 future	 losses	
under suspicion of RE bubbles. As a result, it would advise its customers to delay 
house purchases until prices return to the normal level. 
Meanwhile, in times of economic recession where the prices of the property 
are	 at	 the	 rock	 bottom,	 Islamic	 banks	would	 be	 eager	 to	 advance	 financing	 to	
creditworthy customers. They would do so with hopes of making good capital 
gains once the housing market recovers. Even for customers who may be 
facing temporary problems with the payment of housing instalments during 
recession,	banks	will	not	urge	selling	off	the	houses.	This	 is	further	encouraged	
by the reduction in the instalment requirements due to the declining value of the 
properties during recessionary periods. Those changes in the behavior of banks 
(and	its	expected	influence	on	customers’	behavior)	would	result	in	cooling	down	
of price boom during upturns and avoidance of sharp price declines during 
downturn, thus resulting in the smoothening of the RE cycle6. 
The above analyses suggest that the role of banks should substantially change 
from	being	an	opportunistic	profiteer	 to	a	 sincere	partner	with	 the	adoption	of	
more	Shari’ah	 compliant	 Islamic	financing	products7. Since Islamic banks share 
risk	with	customers	and	will	benefit	from	their	financial	wellbeing,	they	will	act	
as true partners. This partnership based on real economic factors strengthens the 
link	between	real	and	financial	markets	and	reduces	adverse	influences	of	one	on	
the other. 
The	main	objectives	of	this	work	are	twofold.	First,	it	aims	at	demonstrating	
relatively	 high	 fluctuations	 in	 the	 RE	 prices	 under	 the	 conventional	 home	
financing.	And	 second,	 it	 verifies	 the	 superiority	 of	 the	 Enhanced	Musharakah	
Mutanaqisah	(EMM)	home	financing	over	its	conventional	counterpart	in	terms	of	
its	positive	impact	on	real	estate	markets.	To	achieve	these	objectives,	we	will	set	
up	two	alternative	multi-period	models	and	rigorously	analyze	their	impacts	on	
real estate prices through simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing theoretical 
literature	on	home	financing	 in	Section	 II,	 the	paper	 formulates	 two	alternative	
(Conventional	and	EMM	based)	models	of	home	financing	in	Section	III.	In	section	
6.	We	expect	tying	of	home	financing	contract	to	rental	would	make	price	of	housing	
more stable since generally rental is found to be stable. In this respect Sun & Tsang 
(2017)	find	that	some	rigidity	in	rental	contracts	plays	an	important	role	in	explaining	
the	smoothness	of	rents	and	relative	volatility	of	the	price-rent	ratio	under	conventional	
setting.
7.	By	default,	all	 Islamic	finance	products	should	be	Shari’ah	compliant.	Otherwise,	
they	cannot	be	offered	by	Islamic	finance	institutions	(IFIs).	However,	some	of	Islamic	
finance	 products	 such	 as	 al	 Bai’	 al	 Inah	 are	 controversial	 and	 not	 accepted	 by	 the	
majority	of	 Islamic	 schools	 (Madhabs). We use the phrase ‘more Shari’ah compliant’ 
for products which are free of such controversy and more in line with the ‘Objectives 
of Shari’ah’ (i.e. not only complying with the Shari’ah in form but also comply with it 
in substance).
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IV,	the	models	are	enhanced	with	the	inclusion	of	multi-period	profit	maximization	
and are then simulated. In Section V, we draw some economic implications from 
the models and simulated results. Then, some suggestions for further research are 
provided in Section VI before the paper concludes with a general summary of the 
findings	and	some	policy	recommendations	in	VII.	
II. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE ON HOME FINANCING
Large	fluctuation	of	real	estate	(RE)	prices	and	potential	bubbles	in	the	housing	
markets have been of great concern. Taipalus (2006) highlights three reasons why 
bubbles in the housing markets may be harmful to the economy. First, increasing 
property	prices	during	 the	bubble	period	signals	 future	 inflation.	Second,	asset	
price	escalation	and	its	subsequent	corrections	bears	implications	on	financial	and	
banking	system	stability	 since	 it	affects	banks’	valuation	of	 loan	collaterals	and	
consequently	banks’	balance-sheets.	Finally,	asset	price	over-valuation	may	result	
in misallocation of resources. In most cases, this takes place because of economic 
agents’ inability to recognize the existence of RE bubble. Due to these reasons, the 
damage from bursting of housing bubble could be large (Helbling & Terrones, 
2003) especially when the housing value is severely mispriced, as unfolded in 
many	countries	following	the	2007-2008	Subprime	Crisis.	
Theoretically,	 in	 conventional	 finance,	 various	 studies	 have	 examined	 the	
relations	between	financing	and	asset	prices.	A	seminal	work	by	Kiyotaki	&	Moore	
(1997)	 demonstrates	 the	 persistent	 effect	 of	 technological	 or	 income	 shocks	 in	
generating	large	fluctuations	in	the	level	of	output	and	asset	prices	in	the	presence	
of credit limit imposed by lenders. Meanwhile, Iacoviello (2005) shows that, under 
nominal debt credit whose limit is tied to collateral, “… collateral effects dramatically 
improve the response of aggregate demand to housing price shocks; and nominal debt 
improves the sluggish response of output to inflation surprises” (Iacoviello, 2005, p. 739). 
A paper by Sommervoll, Borgersen, & Wennemo (2010) on endogenous housing 
market cycles further shows that the imposition of credit constraints on mortgages 
may result into quite drastic collapses in house prices even if the prices are agreed 
by all of the economic agents. 
The	 strong	 collateral	 effect	 in	 asset	 and	 housing	 markets	 as	 highlighted	
above	 is	normally	attributed	 to	 the	 ‘financial	accelerator’	mechanism	suggested	
by Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999). They claim that the procyclicality of 
the	financial	 system	has	 to	do	with	 asymmetric	 information	 about	 lenders	 and	
collateral values of the pledged asset. Financial accelerator posits a reinforcing 
effect	between	financing	or	housing	markets	and	the	business	cycle.	During	times	
of economic recession when the collateral value is depressed, borrowers will have 
difficulty	 to	 get	 financing	 from	 banks	 irrespective	 of	 the	 project	 quality.	 This	
will	further	reinforce	economic	downturns.	On	the	other	hand,	during	economic	
booms,	 the	 value	 of	 collaterals	 increases	 and	 as	 a	 result,	most	 projects	will	 be	
financed	and,	in	the	process,	further	accelerates	the	economy	and	asset	prices.	
However,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 associate	 all	 large	 swings	 in	 house	 prices	 to	 the	
financial	accelerator	alone.	Borio,	Furfine	&	Lowe	(2001)	argue	that	an	additional	
source	of	financial	procyclicality	has	to	do	with	inappropriate	reaction	of	financial	
market	participants	 to	change	 in	risk.	This	 is	due	to	 the	difficulty	 in	measuring	
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Volume 4, Number 1, August 2018 137
risk or, even if risk is correctly measured, is due to egotistic incentives of some 
market participants. As a result, there would be socially suboptimal decisions. 
Such inappropriate measurement of risk, as argued in the paper, leads to its 
underestimation in times of boom and overestimation in times of recession. 
Therefore, wrong measurement of risk during booms leads to rapid credit growth, 
inflation	in	collateral	value,	artificially	low	lending	spreads	and	shallow	holding	
of	capital	provisions	by	financial	institutions.	The	opposite	is	argued	to	take	place	
during recessions. In short, there would be prolonged booms and deepened 
recession in the business cycles. 
From the above literature, we can see many weaknesses of the conventional 
financial	system,	which	have	translated	into	recurring	instability	in	specific	asset	
markets	as	well	as	 in	the	economy	at	 large.	The	Islamic	financial	system,	to	the	
contrary,	 has	 generally	 been	 considered	 as	 a	 better	 alternative.	 Because	 of	 its	
stronger	ties	to	the	real	sector,	it	is	resilient	to	financial	shocks	and	business	cycles	
(Beck,	Demirgüç-Kunt,	&	Merrouche,	2013;	Chapra,	2011;	Hassan	&	Kayed,	2009;	
Ibrahim,	2016;	Iqbal	&	Mirakhor,	2011).	Even	though	many	of	Islamic	products	look	
like	conventional	financing	products,	the	underlying	principles	on	which	they	are	
based	are	completely	different.	Musharakah	Mutanaqisah	home	financing	is	one	
such	innovative	product,	which	is	based	on	a	partnership	between	a	financer	and	a	
purchaser of housing property. This partnership gives the two parties obligations 
and	rights	for	sharing	of	profit	or	loss	from	rentals	and	changes	in	the	value	of	the	
property	during	ownership	transfer	from	the	financier	to	the	purchaser.
However,	 currently,	 many	 of	 the	 Islamic	 banks	 that	 offer	 Musharakah	
Mutanaqisah	 (MM)	 home	 financing	 link	 rental	 revenue	 to	 interest	 rates	 and	
employ historical value of the property during ownership transfer. Since the 
payment structure and benchmarking rates used in most of current applications 
of	the	MM	home	financing	are	very	similar	to	those	of	conventional	housing	loan,	
it	is	argued	that	its	economic	impact	would	not	be	much	different.	Alternatively,	
some	argue	that	if	the	practice	of	MM	home	financing	is	in	conformity	with	the	
Shari’ah requirements of the product’s underlying contacts8, both economic and 
social	benefits	would	be	substantially	different	(Abdul	Razak	&	Amin,	2013;	Meera	
&	Abdul	Razak,	 2005,	 2009;	 Smolo	&	Hassan,	 2011).	 Some	of	 the	 requirements	
include the link of rental payment to an actual rental measure (such as a locational 
rental index) and the value of the property to be periodically revalued during 
ownership	 transfer,	as	 is	 the	case	 in	 the	EMM	home	financing	model	proposed	
here. 
To	date,	there	is	limited	fundamental	research	evaluating	the	influences	of	the	
above propositions on banks’ behavior, price of housing or the overall economy. 
Among early papers addressing the direct economic impact of Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah	financing	is	Bendjalali	&	Khan	(1995).	Even	if	their	work	does	not	
8.	Underlying	 contacts	 used	 in	 Musharakah	 Mutanaqisah	 home	 financing	 are	
Musharakah	(partnership),	Ijarah	(renting)	and	Bai’	(sale).	Each	of	those	contracts	have	
their relevant Shariah principles driving terms of agreements between parties involved. 
Because it is out of the scope of this paper those principles are not discussed here. 
However, one can refer to Zuhaili (2003) and Usmani (2007) for detailed discussion of 
those contracts.
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directly	 relate	 to	 home	financing,	 it	makes	 a	mathematical	 attempt	 to	model	 a	
standard	MM	product.	 Subsequent	works	 addressing	 directly	 home	 financing,	
which include among others Meera & Abdul Razak (2005, 2009), Smolo & Hassan 
(2011) and Abdul Razak & Amin (2013), do not go beyond analyses of some general 
issues	related	the	MM	and	other	Islamic	home	financings	and/or	some	proposals	
for	resolution	of	financing-related	problems.	
Theoretical works related more closely to the present study are those by 
Ebrahim	&	Hussain	(2010)	and	Ebrahim,	Shackleton,	&	Wojakowski	(2011).	The	
former	suggests	that	the	application	of	Participating	Home	financings	(PMs)	will	
increase	Pareto-efficiency	stemming	from	reduced	agency	costs	and	from	sharing	
of	risks	among	participants	in	financing.	This	should	eventually	lead	to	a	rise	in	
the	property	value.	The	latter	work,	based	on	different	variants	of	PMs	established	
in	the	former,	argues	that	these	PMs	can	improve	the	financial	system	in	terms	of	
efficiency	and	resiliency	due	to	their	cost	efficiency	and	risk-sharing.	
Another	work	which	tries	to	link	equity	based	home	financing	to	stability	of	
the	RE	market	and	the	overall	financial	system	is	Mian	&	Sufi	(2014).	They	propose	
sharing of capital gain and loss from the value of mortgage property between 
the bank and the client in the form of some additional payment by the client at 
time of mortgage’s maturity or termination and as a reduction in the amount of 
installment due to the bank respectively. They argue this will make both lender and 
borrower more thoughtful of the prices of property. However, in their proposition, 
Mian	&	Sufi	(2014)	suggest	that	losses	should	be	shared	according	to	each	party’s	
contribution in the value of property, but only 5% of capital gains should go to 
the bank. They also totally ignore the issue of using rent instead of interest, which 
we	have	earlier	argued	would	also	make	home	financing	unattractive	for	banks	
during boom periods. 
A	problem	with	equity	based	home	financing	alternatives	such	as	in	Ebrahim	
&	Hussain	(2010),	Ebrahim,	Shackleton,	&	Wojakowski	(2011)	and	Mian	&	Sufi	
(2014)	is	in	their	solution	being	only	one	sided.	To	be	more	specific,	we	can	notice	
that the suggested PMs by Ebrahim & Hussain (2010) and Ebrahim, Shackleton, 
&	Wojakowski	(2011)	are	only	limited	to	offering	upside	benefit	to	investors	when	
keeping	downside	risk	with	the	homeowners.	Alternatively,	those	of	Mian	&	Sufi	
(2014)	do	the	opposite	by	making	investors	in	home	financing	to	bear	most	of	the	
downside	risk	while	offering	them	only	marginal	upside	benefits.	Therefore,	we	
can	argue	that	such	one-sided	suggestions	fail	to	bear	in	them	the	true	spirit	of	
Islamic	finance,	i.e.	being	fair	and	just	to	all	parties	involved	in	financing.	
Furthermore, even if the works by Ebrahim & Hussain (2010) and Ebrahim, 
Shackleton,	&	Wojakowski	 (2011)	 suggest	 the	 ability	 of	 PMs	 in	 enhancing	 the	
efficiency	and	resiliency	of	the	financial	system,	there	is	no	mentioning	of	PMs’	
influence	 on	 real	 estate	 cycle.	Also,	 we	 have	 not	 come	 across	 any	 study	 that	
specifically	 links	Musharakah	Mutanaqisah	 or	 PM	 type	 of	 home	 financing	 to	
real estate cycle or optimal pricing of the property. Even if resilience of Islamic 
banks is normally noted, there are not many theoretical papers showing how 
the	 Islamic	 alternative	 enhances	 the	 RE	 market	 efficiency	 or	 prevents	 the	
formation of RE bubbles Additionally, existing studies rarely consider impacts 
that true partnership arrangement under MM could have on the overall economic 
wellbeing. Therefore, we can conclude that there is obvious lack of theoretical 
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research	explaining	the	influence	of	Islamic	home	financing	on	the	RE	market	and	
the economy at large.
III. THE AGGREGATE MODELS OF HOUSING MARKET
3.1. General Background
In	 this	 section,	 we	model	 the	 conventional	 home	 financing	 and	 the	 Enhanced	
Musharakah	Mutanaqisah	(EMM)	home	financing.	While	the	model	assumptions	
are	in	general	similar	to	those	in	Hott	(2011),	the	assumptions	related	to	rationality	
and	market	structure	differ	from	his.	Also,	certain	assumptions	regarding	profit	
and loss calculations under the MM model9	are	completely	different.	In	our	setup,	
there	are	two	types	of	agents	-	households	and	banks	–	who	act	rationally.	
Despite similarities in most assumptions, the Conventional model and the MM 
model	differ	from	each	other	in	two	key	aspects.	First,	while	banks	employ	interest	
rates in the Conventional model, they use actual rental rates for the calculation 
of	profit	from	home	financing	in	the	MM	model.	Second,	while	only	households	
benefit	from	capital	gains	or	bear	capital	losses	in	the	former,	both	the	banks	and	
the households share capital gains or losses according to their shares of ownership 
under the MM model. Next, we will go through details of other assumptions of each 
model	and	clarify	the	differences	as	we	proceed.	We	begin	with	the	Conventional	
model and specify its assumptions, which is followed by descriptions of the MM 
model	highlighting	principally	points	of	difference	from	the	former.
3.2. Conventional Model of Home Financing
In this section, we introduce assumptions of the Conventional model in terms of 
real	estate	and	home	financing	markets,	household	and	banking	sectors	and	their	
interactions with each other. Some assumptions are adopted from previous works 
on	home	financing	while	others	are	unique	to	our	model	specifications.	
3.2.1. Real Estate Market
Similar	to	Kiyotaki	&	Moore	(1997),	Iacoviello	(2005)	and	Hott	(2011),	there	are	S 
identical homes supplied in the real estate market and the market clearing price 
of a home to be equal to Pt in period t. Thus, SPt becomes the value of all homes in 
the economy. 
Additionally,	for	the	sake	of	simplification,	we	equate	S to unity (S = 1). We 
also assume that the utility from consumption and productivity in construction of 
housing have constant returns to scale, and therefore they are not crucial factors in 
the	model.	Those	assumptions	do	not	affect	our	results	qualitatively,	but	rather	are	
used to simplify the process of price determination in the real estate market. For 
9.	In	this	section,	we	are	going	to	used	‘EMM	home	financing’	and	‘the	MM	model’	
terms	 interchangeably	 since	 our	main	 objective	 here	 is	 not	 to	 distinguish	 between	
practiced	 and	 ideal	 version	 of	 MM	 home	 financing.	We	 rather	 intend	 to	 compare	
theoretical	implication	of	the	original	MM	home	financing	on	real	estate	prices	with	
those of the conventional mortgage.
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the conventional model, we assume that only households have ownership of the 
houses. However, the banks make use of the houses as collateral for housing loan 
in case of default by the households.
3.2.2. Market for Home Financing 
We	assume	that	households’	demand	for	home	financing	is	the	only	determinant	
of	demand	in	the	home	financing	market.	On	the	supply	side,	banks	supply	home	
financings	with	a	fixed	maturity	of	T period. In this model, similar to Kiyotaki & 
Moore	(1997)	and	Hott	(2011),	we	assume	that	banks	finance	households’	housing	
loans	with	fixed	mortgage	 rate	 (m)	 and	get	 financing	 for	 themselves	 at	 a	 fixed	
finance	rate	(r). Households make the payments of their housing loans through 
some	fixed	instalments	(I), which cover both interest and principal of the loans.
Another	assumption	which	is	similar	to	Hott	(2011)	is	that	the	loan-to-value	
(LTV) is constant, which is assumed to be 100% for sake of simplicity. This implies 
that	total	home	financings	is	the	same	as	that	of	the	new	housing	stock,	which	is	
Pt.	This	is	so	because	we	assume	on	average	households	need	financing	for	entire	
housing stock they want to possess.
3.2.3. Household Sector
Similar	to	Hott	(2011),	we	assume	that	the	main	source	of	households’	utility	comes	
from their use of housing and consumption of other goods. Further, we assume 
that the discount rate of households is very high (higher than the mortgage rate). 
Similar assumptions are used in other works to ensure that households’ borrowing 
constraint is binding. This means households will accept whatever credit given for 
home	financing.	Therefore,	we	will	be	mainly	concentrating	on	the	borrowing	side	
of	home	financing	market	while	assuming	that	any	amount	of	home	financings	
offered	will	be	accepted	by	households	to	purchase	housing	units.
Households use all their income for payment of housing instalments (Iti) and 
for other consumptions (Cti). In general, we assume that the number of households 
is N. In period t, household i	(i	=	1,	…	,N)	buys	and	finances	a	fraction	fti of the entire 
housing stock, where ∑i=1 fti	=	1.	Therefore,	the	amount	of	financing	from	banks	by	
household i in period t is fti Pt	and	his/her	financing	burden	is	fti Iti. Additionally, in 
this model, we assume that all capital gains or losses from house price change go 
to households since banks do not own any share of the housing stock. However, 
households	do	not	realize	capital	gains/losses	until	the	end	of	the	mortgage	term	
or time of default on their instalment. 
Then, a random labour income Yti is considered as the main source of income 
household i receives in each period t.	Similar	to	Hott	(2011),	we	assume	Yti to be 
uniformly distributed with values ranging from 0 and Y, and the distribution to 
be independent of its historical values. Because of our assumptions about identical 
expected future income for all households and value for all homes, we will end up 
with the same borrowing constraint for all households, each owns a proportional 
fraction of the entire housing stock (i.e. fti =	1	 ⁄	N).	Once	we	normalize	N to one 
(1), the budget constraint for household i with regular housing loan instalment 
requirement of Iti for period t under the conventional model becomes:
N
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Yti > Cti + Iti         (1)
where Cti > 0 is the consumption of household i in period t. Knowing the 
mortgage rate (m)	and	banks’	financing	rate	(r), we can easily calculate installment 
requirement (Iti) of households for any particular year. The installment under 
conventional	financing	(assuming	fixed	interest	rates)	will	be	the	same	throughout	
the entire period of mortgage (Ii) and will be calculated using the simple formula 
of debt amortization:
         (2)
where P0	stands	for	the	price	of	the	house	at	the	start	of	home	financing.
Assuming	 non-negativity	 of	 consumption,	 household	 simply	 defaults	 if	 its	
income falls short of installment requirement (i.e. Yi < Ii). In the case of default, the 
house	would	be	sold	and	the	cost	of	financing	recovered.	The	bank	does	not	suffer	
any loss as long as selling price of the house covers remaining balance (Bt), which 
is calculated using the conventional formula for each year as follows: 
         (3)
Thus, household defaults only if Yti < Ii, and makes loss only if 
Yti < Ii -	(E(Pt+1)	-	Bt)       (4)
Going back to our assumption of uniform distribution of household income 
between 0 and Yt, probability of default for the bank becomes:
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5)
And probability of losses becomes:
         (6)
Here we have to make sure that the probability of losses is positive and does not 
exceed that of default, i.e. 0 < ΩtI < Ωtd. Therefore, two additional conditions also 
apply:
Ωt
I = Ωtd if E(Pt+1) - Bt < 0    (7)
Ωt
I = 0 if E(Pt+1) - Bt > 1    (8) 
Overall,	we	have	three	possibilities	for	the	household	and	bank	at	the	end	of	each	
period: 
1)  Household makes full payment of instalment and continues to the next period, 
the	probability	of	which	is	equal	to	1	-	Ωt
d. 
2)  Household defaults on instalment, but proceeds from home liquidation cover 
all	of	its	debt	and	payment	obligations.	Probability	of	which	is	the	difference	
between equations (5) and (6), i.e. Ωtd -	ΩtI or
Iti = Ii =
mP0
1-(1+m)_
 
T
Bti = Bt = Ii
1-(1+m)_
 
(T - t)
m
Ωt
d = I
Yt
Ωt
i = if 0 < E(Pt+1) - Bt < I
I - (E(Pt+1) - Bt)
Yt
if 0 < E(Pt+1) - Bt < I.(E(Pt+1) - Bt)
Yt
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3)  Household defaults on instalment and proceeds from home liquidation don’t 
cover all of its debt and payment obligations, the probability of which is equal 
to equation (6), (7) or (8) depending on the value of (E(Pt+1) - Bt). This is the case 
when bank makes losses and we call it total default. 
All of those three cases for the household under conventional model are illustrated 
in Fig. 1.
Figure	1.	Banking	Sector’s	Expected	Profit	or	Loss	from	Mortgage	Loan	Under	
Conventional Model
Default (2) No Default (3)
N=1 Households
Loss/Total Default (3)
Income + Capital GainIncome
Y Max Income
It Installment Duty
mPt
rPt
E(Pt+1)-Bt
[It - (E(Pt+1)-Bt)]/Yt
0
Mortgage Duty
Refinancing Cost
It / Yt
Payment of Principle Margin Income Loss From Mortgage
3.2.4. Banking Sector
An essential element in our model is the banking sector. We adopt several 
assumptions	 from	 Hott	 (2011)	 for	 convenience	 and,	 more	 importantly,	 for	
comparability between the Conventional model and the MM model. Here we 
assume	banks	to	be	identical	and	risk	neutral	and	they	are	not	able	to	differentiate	
between	different	households	upfront.	Nevertheless,	we	also	assume	that	banks	
are aware of each household’s expected income stream and distribution and they 
form expectations rationally.
Additionally, we also assume that the banking sector tries to maximize its 
profit	and	banks	cooperate	with	each	other	for	this	purpose.	In	this	respect,	the	
banking sector could be considered as competitive and at the same time it is able 
to	realize	some	positive	economic	profits,	unlike	the	assumption	of	zero	economic	
profit	in	Hott	(2011).	However,	similar	to	Hott	(2011),	we	also	assume	that	banks	
cannot	make	decisions	about	mortgage	or	financing	rates	on	their	own10 and only 
make	decision	about	the	amount	of	the	home	financings	they	advance.	Since	we	
assumed N=1	and	LTV=100%,	we	have	both	the	quantity	of	financing	and	the	price	
10. We assume that central bank dictates those rates to the banking sector, which is not 
too much of abstraction from the real situation in most of the countries.
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of housing equal to Pt. Here, we assume that the mortgage rate (m) is constant and 
positive	and	banks	borrow	at	a	constant	financing	rate	(r), which is between zero 
and m (0 < r < m). Thus, in period t + 1, the banking sector’s revenue from margin 
income will be (m -	r)Pt. In addition, we will consider that banks gain or lose nothing 
from house price changes from one period to another (Pt+1	–	Pt), due to the reason 
that the banks do not own the property. Furthermore, because of banks’ inability 
to	distinguish	between	“good”	and	“bad”	households	upfront,	they	also	finance	
households who will default. Due to those defaults, banks’ earnings reduce by the 
fraction rt+1	of	their	home	financing	exposure.	Hence,	expected	profits	for	banks	is
 
E(πt+1) = Pt [m	-	r -	E(rt+1)]      (9) 
It	can	be	considered	as	the	difference	between	interest	income	(striped	rectangle)	
and expected loss (grey triangle) areas in Fig. 1. 
Since	 the	 banking	 sector	 does	 its	 best	 to	maximize	 profit,	 banks	would	 be	
willing	to	provide	home	financing	facilities	till	the	point	where	expected	profit	is	
maximized.	Existence	of	loss	from	default	will	limit	the	amount	of	home	financing,	
thus the price of housing (Pt). The increase in price moves up the instalment (It), 
the mortgage duty (mPt)	and	the	financing	costs	(rPt) lines, while also increases the 
revenue from interest spread. However, given that the expected real estate price in 
period t + 1 is unchanged, the households’ expected capital gains decline and the 
“Income	+	Capital	gain”	line	in	Fig.	1	is	pushed	downwards.	Both	of	those	effects	
do not have impact on the interest margin (m - r), except for reducing the expected 
capital gains for the households (E(Pt+1)	-	Pt) and increasing the expected rate of 
losses (rt+1).	Therefore,	banks	set	the	quantity	of	home	financing	at	point	where	the	
expected	profit	is	maximized:
 MaxPt E(πt+1) = Pt [m	-	r -	E(rt+1)]     (10)
Overall,	the	banking	sector	has	control	over	home	financing	(Pt). Accordingly, 
banks	provide	the	optimal	level	of	financing	which	maximizes	their	profit.	
3.3. Musharakah Mutanaqisah (MM) Model of Home Financing
In this section, we develop the theoretical structure of the Enhanced Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah	(EMM)	home	financing	model.	There	are	some	other	proposals	of	
the	MM	 home	 financing	with	 similar	 specifications	 such	 as	 those	 by	Meera	&	
Abdul Razak (2005, 2009) and Abdul Razak & Amin (2013). However, those works 
do	not	analyze	theoretically	the	impacts	that	the	MM	home	financing	will	have	on	
the real estate market or the economy at large. 
Meanwhile,	analyzing	the	theoretical	impacts	of	Participating	Home	financings	
(PMs)	on	the	financial	system,	Ebrahim	&	Hussain	(2010)	and	Ebrahim,	Shackleton,	
&	Wojakowski	(2011)	propose	home	financing	models	substantially	different	from	
the	MM	home	financing	model	proposed	here.	Even	if	the	Shared	Equity	Home	
financings	 (SEMs)	version	of	 the	PMs	proposed	by	them	is	similar	 to	 the	EMM	
model	to	some	degree,	some	of	our	hypotheses	run	counter	to	the	findings	of	the	
above-mentioned	works.	That	difference	could	be	due	to	some	discrepancies	 in	
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model assumptions and approaches to the problem11.	For	instance,	one	difference	
is	in	the	profit	and	loss	sharing	assumption,	which	is	adopted	in	its	entirely	in	the	
EMM model but adopted partially in all variants of PMs. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the model and approach used in this paper is 
quite	different	from	the	ones	used	in	other	works	on	Islamic	home	financing.	The	
detailed features of the EMM model will be explained together with descriptions 
of its assumptions.
3.3.1. Real Estate and Home Financing Markets
Most of the assumptions regarding the real estate market aspect of the Enhanced 
Musharakah	Mutanaqisah	 home	 financing	model	 (MM	model	 afterwards)	 are	
similar	 to	 those	 of	 the	 Conventional	model.	 The	main	 difference	 between	 the	
Conventional and MM models relates to the assumption of ownership. In contrast 
to	the	Conventional	model,	the	MM	model	assumes	joint	ownership	of	the	property	
between banks and households with their respective shares corresponding to 
their	investment	in	the	property.	On	the	basis	of	the	Musharakah	(partnership)	
principle	of	 the	MM,	all	 involved	parties	should	share	 the	profits	according	 to	
mutually agreed ratios and losses according to their shares of ownership in the 
property.
The	modus	operandi	of	 the	MM	home	financing	is	as	follows.	It	starts	with	
banks	buying	houses	in	partnership	with	households	and	the	former	sell	off	their	
shares	in	the	houses	to	the	latter	throughout	home	financing	period	of	T. We assume 
this	process	 takes	place	 smoothly	 throughout	 the	entire	home	financing	period	
and banks own share of the new housing stock according to the proportion of their 
financing	while	households	own	the	rest.	Unlike	in	the	Conventional	model,	we	
assume	that	households	pay	to	the	banks	a	portion	of	fixed	rental	(M) and banks 
finance	their	home	financing	with	fixed	financing	payment	(R) according to their 
share in ownership. 
3.3.2. Household Sector
Besides the general assumptions of household sector as in the Conventional model, 
assumptions	 regarding	household	 sector	 under	 the	MM	model	 are	different	 in	
terms	 of	 financing	 and	default	 probabilities.	Here,	we	 assume	 that	 households	
use their entire income for paying their house rental to banks (bti- 1 M), buying out 
some shares of the house (sti Pt-1) and for consumption purposes (Cti). At year t 
household i will own certain share of the house equal to hti = ∑tx = 0 Sti- x , and share 
11.	 Some	 clear	differences	 are	 in	product	 features,	 approaches	 and	 results.	 First,	 as	
mentioned earlier in Introduction, while SEMs only capture upside potential of 
earnings and price gains from home ownership, the EMM covers both upside gains and 
downside risk of property ownership. Next, this work approaches the issue from more 
macro	perspectives	while	 the	above-mentioned	works	use	more	micro	perspectives.	
Finally, our results in Section 4 suggest that in general prices of the properly will 
decrease with the adoption of the EMM model, while the results from Ebrahim & 
Hussain (2010) suggest that the property prices would increase if the PMs are adopted. 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Volume 4, Number 1, August 2018 145
owned	in	the	beginning	of	financing	is	equal	to	hit0 where t0 refers to beginning 
period. Thus, the rental burden of household i in period t	is:	(1	-	hti- 1)M. 
Additionally, in the MM model, the households have income from capital gains 
in proportion to their ownership shares (hti). However, they do not realize capital 
gains until the end of the mortgage term or when they default due to the inability 
to make the required payment to the banks. The following budget constraint under 
the MM model for household i in period t with regular acquisition of sti share of 
the house from banks:
Yti > Cti +	bti-1 M +	sti Pt-1      (1`)
where Cti > 0 is the consumption of household i in period t, bti-1	=	(1	-	hti- 1) is the bank 
i’s ownership share in the house at period t-1 and sti Pt-1 is the required payment 
for share acquisition by household i in period t. Since consumption cannot be 
negative, household i defaults if Yti < bti-1 M +	sti Pt-1. Because income is uniformly 
distributed over 0 to Yt in period t, the probability of a household’s defaulting on 
rental payment and acquisition of sti share of the house is:
 
         (2`)
However,	failure	to	aquire	the	specified	share	from	the	banks	does	not	mean	
total default. According to the MM agreement, households can’t be forced to 
acquire the house from the banks and thus they are only considered defaulting if 
they fail to pay rent (bti-1 M). Assuming that households only pays rents, the new 
budget contstraint for those households would be:
Yti > Cti +	bti-1 M        (3`)
Since household does not acquire the share of the house from the banks, it 
does not have to pay sti Pt-1 to the banks (so this fraction is missing from the right 
hand	side	of	the	inequality	and	it	is	the	main	difference	of	equation	(3`)	from	(2`).	
Again, assuming that consumption cannot be negative household i defaults only if 
Yti < bti-1 M. Thus, in period t the probability that a household will default is:
         (4`)
Overall,	we	have	three	possibilities	for	households:	
1)  Households pay full rent and acquire the share that they is supposed to acquire 
from the banks for the given year (sti Pt-1),	the	probability	of	which	is	1	-	Ωta . 
2)  Households pay full rent but acquire none or only a part of the share that they 
are supposed to acquire from the banks for a given year, The probability of 
which	is	the	difference	between	(2`)	and	(4`),	Ωt
a -	Ωt
b or sti Pt-1 / Yt.
3)  Households fail to pay even full rent and of course acquire none of the share 
that they are supposed to acquire from the banks for the given year, the 
probability of which is equal to (4`). This is the total default case. However, 
if we generalize the case for all households, equations (5`) and (6`) below will 
replace (2`) and (4`) respectively.
Ωt
a =
bt
i
-1 M +	sti Pt-1
Yt
Ωt
b =
bt
i
-1 M
Y
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         (5`)
         (6`)
The graphical representation of all three cases for the households is shown in 
Figure 2 below:
Ωt
a =
bt
 
- 1 M +	st Pt-1
Y
Ωt
b =
bt
 
- 1 M
Y
Figure 2. Households’ Income, Consumption, Rental & Acquisition Duties and 
Defaults Under MM model
Default to Acquire (2) No Default (1) N=1 HouseholdsTotal Default (3)
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0
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3.3.3. Banking sector
In	 the	 MM	 model,	 contrary	 to	 Hott	 (2011),	 we	 will	 introduce	 some	 distinct	
assumptions. The assumptions which we have not mentioned in this part should 
be considered similar to the ones we have made for the Conventional model. 
Here	 we	 assume	 that	 banks	 provide	 home	 financings	 under	 the	 Musharakah	
Mutanaqisah principles to households for a constant amount of rental (M) while 
financing	 themselves	with	constant	financing	amount	 (R). The portion of rental 
received	and	financing	paid	depend	on	bank’s	 latest	 share	of	ownership	 in	 the	
house, i.e. bt - 1 M and bt - 1 R	 repectively.	Accordingly,	 the	expected	profit	can	be	
written	 as	 equation	 (7`)	 below,	which	 can	 be	 shown	 as	 the	 difference	 between	
striped and grey areas in Fig 3.
E(πt + 1) = bt [M	-	R -	E(rt+1) Pt]	+	st +1 [E(Pt+1)	-	Pt ]   (7`) 
The implications of those assumptions are such that both the rental amount 
and	the	financing	cost	are	independent	of	the	house	price	(i.e.	the	home	financing).	
Like	the	Conventional	model,	banks	provide	the	amount	of	home	financing	that	
maximizes	their	profit:
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MaxPt E(πt + 1) = bt [M	-	R -	E(rt+1) Pt]	+	st +1 [E(Pt+1)	-	Pt ]   (8`)
Here also, like the Conventional model, the banks provide the optimal level of 
financing	till	the	point	of	profit	maximisation.	However,	the	optimal	points	may	
not	be	the	same	in	those	two	models	since	their	objective	functions	and	constraints	
are	different.	
Figure 3. Banks’ Expected Capital Gain or Loss, Rental Margin & Expected Loss 
from Rental Under MM Model
N=1 Households
Income
Y Max Income
Banks’ Exp. Revenue
Rental Duty
btR
btM
btM /Yt
Refinancing Cost
Capital Gain or Loss Rental Income Expected Rental Loss
bt-1M + st+1[E(Pt+1)-P0]
Default No Default
IV. MULTI-PERIOD MODELS OF HOME FINANCING
Even	though	we	have	mentioned	that	homes	are	financed	for	more	than	one	(T) 
period	in	the	earlier	section,	we	have	not	discussed	banks’	multi-period	objective	
functions or assumptions regarding income and house prices. In this section, 
we will further develop our two models (i.e. Conventional and MM models). 
Following are additional assumptions, which are applicable to the Conventional 
model or the MM model or both. 
For	both	models,	rather	than	assuming	households	get	financing	for	only	one	
period	we	 assume	 that	 households	get	financing	 for	 the	 entire	period	of	home	
financing	(T).
i.  We assume that banks have rational expectations about the future maximum 
income for households (Et(Yt+n)) as well as the future price of the houses 
(Et(P+n)),	which	are	specified	by	the	following	equations:
 (Et(Yt+n) = Et (Yt+n|Yt-1 , Yt-2 , ... Yt-T)      (11) or (9`)
 (Et(Pt+n) = Et (Pt+n|Pt-1 , Pt-2 , ... Pt-T)    (12) or (10’)
ii.  Household income is assumed to move in a cyclical fashion according to the 
mean income over the years with the cycle reoccurring in constant intervals.
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While	 households	 take	 the	 price	 risk	 in	 conventional	 mortgage	 financing,	
both banks and households share the risk according to their respective shares of 
ownership	in	the	MM	home	financing.	For	the	calculation	of	banks’	home	financing	
revenues	and	costs,	we	use	fixed	mortgage	and	financing	rates	for	conventional	
financing	and	the	fixed	rental	and	financing	amounts	for	MM	financing.	
4.1. Conventional model of multi-period profit maximization
We	begin	the	model	by	first	defining	components	of	banks’	profit	function.	Total	
revenue	is	the	financing	margin	obtained	by	the	banks	(i.e.	Bt-1(m-r)), total loss is 
the probability of loss times incurred loss (i.e. [I - (E(Pt+1) - Bt+1)]2 /	2Yt )12. Finally, the 
net	profit	equals	gross	profit	less	total	loss	times	continued	financing.	Continued	
financing	is	the	fraction	of	borrowers	who	have	not	defaulted	on	their	installment	
obligation	(i.e.	1	-	Ωt
d =	1	-	I	/	Yt	).	Therefore,	the	expected	net	profit	of	banks	for	a	
given year t is:
 
         (13)
where Ft = Ft - 1	(1	-	It /	Yt) and F0 = 1
Here Ft represents the fraction of the original households who continue with home 
financing.	
The	objective	of	the	banks	would	be	to	maximize	the	net	present	value	(NPV)	
of	expected	net	profits	throughout	the	life	of	the	mortgage,	subject	to	all	the	given	
constraints.	Therefore,	we	will	have	following	objective	function:
         (14)
To	calculate	the	net	present	value	(NPV)	of	expected	net	profits	we	are	using	
mortgage rate mainly because it is the opportunity cost of funds for the banks. 
Here,	the	banks	will	set	optimal	amount	of	financing	and	thus	the	housing	price	at	
period t = 0 (i.e. P0)	to	maximize	the	NPV	of	all	future	profits.
4.2. Musharakah Mutanaqisah (MM) Model of Multi-Period Profit Maximization
Assumptions	will	be	somewhat	different	 in	the	case	of	the	MM	model.	First,	as	
mentioned	in	Section	3.2,	banks	provide	home	financing	for	constant	rental	amount	
(M)	and	finance	it	with	fixed	financing	payment	(R). We assume those rates do not 
change	 throughout	home	financing	period.	This	 is	based	on	 two	assumptions	 -	
there	 is	no	inflation	and	the	average	income	stays	the	same	even	if	 it	fluctuates	
around its mean. Since the rent is more stable than income or price of housing, 
we	assume	it	to	be	constant.	The	same	goes	with	financing	cost	of	banks	since	it	is	
derivative of rental13. 
E(πt) = Bt(m	-	r)	- Ft
[I - (E(Pt+1) - Bt+1)]2
2Yt 
E(πt)
(1+m)t
MaxP0 E(P) = St
 
= 1
T
12. The total loss can be calculated by using the area of loss depicted in Fig. 3.
13.	We	will	relax	this	assumption	of	fixed	rental	and	financing	amounts	in	one	of	the	
simulations	of	the	MM	model	and	let	them	to	fluctuate	along	the	household	income.	
As can be seen in the next section the relaxation of this assumption does not change 
simulation	outcomes	of	the	MM	model	significantly.
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Here, we assume that households default if they fail to pay installment 
requirement (It) for that year14.	But	installments	will	be	determined	differently	in	
the case of the MM model and they vary year by year depending on the market 
price of the house. The installment in year t is calculated using the following 
formula:
         (11`)
Where bt-1 stands for the fraction of the house owned by the bank at period t-1 and 
mt-1 stands for rate of discounting used by the bank, which depends on house price 
and rent bt and mt are calculated as follows: 
         (12`)
         
         (13`)
Once	 (12`)	 is	 known	 we	 can	 easily	 calculate	 the	 fraction	 owned	 by	 the	
household ht as ht = 1	-	bt. Similar to conventional case, household simply defaults 
if its income is less than installment requirement (i.e. Yti < It). In this case, the house 
would be liquidated and its price would be shared between the household and 
the	bank	according	 to	 their	ownership	shares.	Bank	does	not	 suffer	any	 loss	of	
revenue as long as household’s fraction in the property along with its income 
covers installment for that period. Thus, household defaults only if Yti < It, and loss 
in revenue only occurs if 
Yti < It -	ht+1E(Pt+1)       (14`)
Given the assumption of uniform distribution of household income between 0 and 
Yt, the probability of default for the household becomes:
         (15`)
And the probability of loss is:
         (16`)
Since it shares capital gain or loss per its share of ownership, the bank also 
exposes to the price risk in addition the loss in revenue. Therefore, there are two 
14. As was mentioned earlier if we stick to true principles of Musharakah, household 
cannot be considered defaulting on its obligation as long as it is paying rental portion 
of the installment. In other words, there is no real obligation for household to acquire 
certain amount of bank’s share at a particular period of time. However, to make our 
analysis	 comparable	 to	 conventional	 home	 financing	we	 consider	 household	 to	 be	
defaulting once it fails to pay the installment. Currently, this practice is also considered 
as a norm even with Islamic banks. 
It =
bt-1 Pt-1 mt-1
1-(1+mt-1)-(T-t+1)
bt = =
bt-1 Pt-1 -	(It - bt-1 Pt-1 mt-1) bt-1 Pt-1 (1 + mt-1)	-	It
Pt-1 Pt-1
mt =
Mt
Pt
Ωt
d =
It 
Yt
Ωt
I = if
It - ht+1E(Pt+1) It - ht+1E(Pt+1) > 0Yt
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additional	 sources	 of	 profit	 or	 loss	 from	 the	 changes	 in	 house	 price.	 The	 first	
source is from yearly exposure resulting from the transfer of shares through part 
of installments. Here, the bank can gain if the current price is higher than the initial 
price	at	the	time	of	financing.	The	second	source	is	the	price	risk	exposure	at	the	
time	of	premature	liquidation	either	because	of	default	or	early	settlement.	Here,	
the exposure captures the entire share of the house owned by the bank. Those two 
exposures give us the Total Exposure (TEt), which have both downside and upside 
risks, and its expected value could be represented as follows:
         (17`)
Putting	all	those	considerations	together,	the	expected	net	profit	of	the	bank	under	
MM model for a given year t	is	written	as	follows:
         (18`)
As	defined	 in	 the	 conventional	model,	Ft represents the fraction of original 
households	with	financing	in	the	previous	period	and	continue	with	the	financing	
this	period.	In	the	MM	case,	the	objective	of	the	bank	would	be	similar,	which	is	to	
maximize	the	net	present	value	(NPV)	of	expected	net	profits	throughout	the	life	
of	the	mortgage,	subject	to	all	of	the	given	constraints.	Therefore,	we	will	have	the	
following	objective	function:
         (19`)
Note	that	we	use	the	initial	profit	rate	(mo) to calculate the NPV of the expected net 
profits.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	the	opportunity	cost	of	funds	for	the	bank	at	the	
initial stage is equal to that rate of return. 
4.3. Simulation results
Having	defined	each	model,	we	proceed	to	simulation	of	the	models	and	compare	
the simulation results of the Conventional and MM models. We set the mean of 
the maximum income (Yt)	to	be	equal	to	10	and	its	fluctuation	to	be	0.5	or	5%	of	
the	mean	value.	The	fluctuation	of	income	is	represented	by	the	sine	function	with	
the full cycle completing in 20 periods (years). The bank also expects future house 
prices	to	fluctuate	in	a	similar	fashion	with	their	values	fluctuating	by	5%	of	the	
average15. For the conventional case, we set the mortgage rate to 5% and bank 
financing	rate	to	2.5%.	
As	for	the	MM	case,	we	use	fixed	rental	amount	and	financing	cost	(which	are	
equated	to	mortgage	and	financing	paid	for	the	average	amount	of	home	financing	
E(TEt) = (bt -	bt+1)(Pt -	P0)	- [bt+1(E(Pt+1)	-	P0)] 
It 
Yt
E(πt) = bt (Mt -	Rt)	- E(TEt) Ft+
[It	-	ht+1E(Pt+1)]2
E(πt)
(1+mo)t
MaxP0 E(P) = St
 
= 1
T
15. We are aware that usual shape of both business cycle and real estate cycle has longer 
phase of growth and relatively shorter decline phase. However, the results should not 
be	significantly	different	even	if	we	use	symmetric	cycles	represented	by	sine	function.	
In another note, our assumption about full RE cycle completing in 20 years is in line 
with	findings	of	the	most	papers,	which	found	it	to	be	between	15-20	years.
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under the conventional case). Later, we relax this assumption and allow them to 
fluctuate	in	the	same	manner	as	income.	We	set	the	total	period	of	mortgage	(T) 
to be 30 years and consideration of default or continuation decision to be done 
annually.	Simulations	are	conducted	for	21	periods	(years)	just	to	make	sure	that	
both the RE and business cycles are completed in full. The results obtained from 
the simulation of the Conventional and MM models are presented below in tables 
1 and 2 respectively. 
Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics of Simulation Results for Conventional Model
Max 
Income
Price of 
Housing
NPV of E. 
Profit
Installment 
Requirement 
Max.
Cons.
1st Year 
Defaults
Mean 10.000 45.420 2.782 2.955 7.045 0.295
S.D. 0.363 13.160 0.327 0.856 0.959 0.084
C.V.* 0.036 0.290 0.117 0.290 0.136 0.283
Min 9.500 28.556 2.316 1.858 5.722 0.186
Max 10.500 64.650 3.208 4.206 8.390 0.414
*C.V.	stands	for	coefficient	of	variation,	which	is	ratio	of	a	variable’s	standard	deviation	to	its	mean.
Parameter
Statistics
(Yt) (Yt -	It)(Pt) (Ω1d)(It)( )
Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics of Simulation Results EMM Model
Max 
Income
Price of 
Housing
NPV of E. 
Profit
Installment 
Requirement 
Max.
Cons.
1st Year 
Defaults
Mean 10.000 19.511 4.437 2.362 7.638 0.237
S.D. 0.363 2.768 0.362 0.041 0.389 0.011
C.V.* 0.036 0.142 0.082 0.017 0.051 0.045
Min 9.500 16.059 3.968 2.315 7.105 0.222
Max 10.500 23.716 4.966 2.427 8.173 0.251
*C.V.	stands	for	coefficient	of	variation,	which	is	ratio	of	a	variable’s	standard	deviation	to	its	mean.
Parameter
Statistics
(Yt) (Yt -	It)(Pt) (Ω1d)(It)( )
From	tables	1	and	2,	we	can	observe	some	interesting	differences.	The	mean	
as	well	as	the	standard	deviation	and	coefficient	of	variation	(i.e.	fluctuation)	of	
house	prices	seem	to	be	much	lower	under	the	MM	setting	than	the	Conventional	
setting.	This	difference	is	further	depicted	in	Figure	4.	In	addition,	the	expected	
profit	under	the	MM	setting	is	higher	and	less	volatile	(See	Fig.	5).	We	may	also	
observe that the required installment and its variation are also lower when the 
MM models is used (See Fig. 6). This in fact translates into higher and smoother 
consumption of other goods. The overall results seem to be supportive of our 
profit	and	loss	sharing	oriented	financing	(under	MM	model).	It	leads	banks	to	be	
less	aggressive	in	terms	of	advancing	home	financing,	as	manifested	by	lower	and	
more	stable	prices	under	the	MM	setting	as	presented	in	figures	4	and	7.	
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A comparison of normalized values (around 1.00) of the household income 
and	house	prices,	as	given	in	Figure	7,	further	insights	on	the	relative	fluctuation	
of	 each	 variable	 and	 on	 the	 co-movement	 of	 prices	 (i.e.	 financing)	 and	 income	
under the two models. 
Figure 4.
Comparison	of	Housing	Price	Under	Conventional	and	MM	Settings
Figure 5. Comparison	of	banking	sector’s	expected	profit	under	Conventional
and	MM	settings
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In	terms	of	fluctuation	we	know	that	income	is	assumed	to	fluctuate	within	
5%	range	around	the	mean.	Furthermore,	when	we	compare	relative	fluctuation	of	
prices	under	Conventional	and	MM	settings	we	can	observe	the	huge	differences.	
Figure 6. Comparison of Max. Income and Consumptions, and Installment 
Requirement	of	HHs	Under	Conventional	and	MM	Settings	
Figure 7. Comparison of Normalized Income and House Prices Under 
Conventional	and	MM	Settings
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While	the	fluctuation	of	House	prices	(and	therefore	home	financing)	under	the	
MM model is approximately within 20% of the mean value, it is about twice the 
size	 (i.e.	within	 40%	 of	 the	mean	 value)	 under	 the	 conventional	 setting.	When	
it comes to the cyclical behavior of house prices, it is easily observable that the 
house	prices	(i.e.	home	financing	by	banks)	under	the	MM	setting	tend	to	be	more	
counter-cyclical	than	those	under	the	Conventional	setting.
Finally,	 even	 if	 we	 relax	 the	 assumption	 of	 the	 fixed	 rental	 and	 financing	
cost	 under	 the	MM	 setting,	 the	 results	 pertaining	 to	 house	 prices,	 installment	
requirement	and	other	parameters	are	not	significantly	different	from	the	earlier	
results. In fact, as can be observed from Table 3 and Fig. 8, house prices become 
even more smoother around the same price range. Therefore, we can safely 
conclude	 that	 irrespective	 of	 the	 assumptions	 about	 rental	 and	financing	 costs,	
we	will	be	getting	better	results	under	the	MM	setting.	This	simulated	evidence	is	
Figure 8. Comparison of House Prices Under MM Models with Fixed and 
Floating Rental and Financing Costs
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Table 3.
Comparison of Descriptive Statistics of Simulation Results for Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah Model with Fixed and Floating Rental and Financing costs
Price of 
Housing
(MM Fixed)
Price of 
housing
(MM float)
Installment 
requirement
(MM fixed)
Installment 
requirement
(MM float)
1st year 
default rate 
(MM fixed)
1st year 
default rate 
(MM float)
Mean 19.511 19.473 2.362 2.361 0.237 0.236
S.D. 2.768 2.299 0.041 0.066 0.011 0.002
C.V.* 0.142 0.118 0.017 0.028 0.045 0.010
Min 16.059 16.532 2.315 2.264 0.222 0.233
Max 23.716 22.938 2.427 2.447 0.251 0.240
Parameter
Statistics
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taken	as	a	proof	of	our	hypothesis	that	the	enhanced	MM	Islamic	home	financing	
has	a	better	ability	in	smoothing	the	RE	cycle.	Furthermore,	the	counter-cyclicality	
of the MM model means that it can act as an automatic stabilizer.
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
The simulation results presented in Section 4.3 serve as an unambiguous evidence 
for	the	superiority	of	the	Islamic	home	financing	over	the	conventional	housing	
loan. Some of such advantages are its contribution towards the reduction of house 
price	inflation,	smoothening	of	the	real	estate	cycle	and	home	financing	counter-
cyclicality.	Some	other	expected	benefits	are	less	problem	of	adverse	selection	at	
time	of	advancing	housing	loans	and	other	benefits	to	economy	from	adoption	of	
the	EMM	home	financing.
5.1. Benefits to the Economy
As	can	be	observed	in	many	countries,	the	pro-cyclical	behavior	of	real	estate	(RE)	
prices characterized by the formation of RE bubbles during the expansion phase 
and bursting of the bubbles during the contraction phase have had disastrous real 
consequences.	One	reason	for	 the	 formation	of	 the	RE	bubbles	 is	easy	access	 to	
housing loans during times of economic boom. We suspect (as many others) that 
opportunistic behavior of conventional banks drives them to advance housing 
loans	to	many	(and	sometimes	underqualified)	home-buyers	at	times	of	economic	
boom, even if the risk of housing bubbles is evident at the time. Such a behavior by 
banks	would	result	in	the	increase	in	house	prices	not	justifiable	by	the	real	sector	
and	their	eventual	corrections	or	burst	would	inflict	substantial	losses	to	all	sectors	
of the economy.
However, this behavior will most likely change if a bank adopts the proposed 
EMM	home	financing	where	the	rental	revenue	is	tied	to	a	real	rental	measure	and	
a fair value of the property is used at times of share transfer. Firstly, since the bank 
is going to share the capital gains or losses from change in value of the property, it 
would	not	be	so	eager	to	advance	financing	if	there	is	suspicion	of	the	RE	bubbles.	
Furthermore, the bank’s welfare will be in line with the wellbeing of its clients 
and therefore, under suspicion of housing bubbles, it would recommend them to 
delay the purchase of homes until the RE prices return to their normal level. Those 
changes in the behavior of banks would result in cooling down of price boom 
during upturns and stall the decline in prices during downturns. Consequently, 
the	RE	 cycle	would	be	 smoother.	Our	 simulation	 results	 of	 the	 two	alternative	
models substantiate these observations. Another important observation from the 
results	is	the	house	prices	being	lower	under	the	MM	home	financing.	This	may	be	
due to the reduction in adverse selection problems. 
5.2. The Reduction in Adverse Selection Problem
The	problem	of	adverse	selection	is	substantially	milder	under	the	MM	setting.	We	
could argue in opposition to what is commonly believed that the issue of adverse 
selection in conventional banking is not always related to problem of asymmetric 
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information. Excessive reliance on collateral, motivation for aggressive loan 
advancement and real possibility of risk transfer do encourage banks to lend to 
those clients with high risk. However, under the proposed EMM model, the above 
risk-seeking	drivers	are	absent.	As	a	consequence,	the	economy	stands	to	benefit.	
Even though the mathematical model of the MM presented in the previous 
sections does not incorporate most of the qualitative aspects of an ideal MM home 
financing,	it	incorporates	some	key	features	related	to	collateralization.	Since	the	
bank cannot use the client’s share as collateral to cover its loss under the MM 
setting,	it	will	not	take	any	undesirable	risk.	Further,	since	the	bank	cannot	transfer	
away loan to a third party without client’s approval, it should be more prudent 
during the screening process. All of these could result in much reduction in the 
adverse selection problems.
5.3. Preventing Formation of Real Estate Bubbles
Less	fluctuating	RE	price	fluctuation	and	lower	price	inflation	could	mean	much	
lower chances of RE bubble formation. This means that that the RE bubble 
formation and its magnitudes can be greatly subdued by the introduction of the 
EMM	home	financing.	Accordingly,	the	negative	impact	resulting	from	bursting	of	
such bubble on the economy can be largely avoided. As noted earlier, the bursting 
of RE bubbles can be damaging to the economy twice the size of the damage from 
bursting of equity bubbles (Helbling & Terrones, 2003).
All	in	all,	there	are	many	benefits	to	the	economy	from	adoption	of	the	EMM	
model.	To	sum,	these	benefits	include	reduction	in	house	price	inflation,	stability	
in the RE prices and, most importantly, less likelihood of RE bubble formation. 
Prevention	of	the	RE	bubbles	can	significantly	increase	confidence	in	the	strength	
of the economy and foster uninterrupted real economic activities. 
VI. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We admit that the models presented here are by no means comprehensive and 
do	not	consider	all	aspects	of	home	financing	industry,	let	along	other	aspects	of	
the economy. However, we also believe that our assumptions are realistic enough 
to	demonstrate	the	influences	of	Conventional	vs.	EMM	financing	on	real	estate	
prices. Nevertheless, further extension of this work is possible in many respects. 
First, one may consider incorporating a more realistic assumption about 
household income. There are two aspects that stand out. Firstly, the assumption 
of uniform distribution is less realistic and it is adopted for the sake of simplicity. 
A more realistic assumption would be a normal distribution or even a positively 
skewed one. Second, the models do not impose restriction on the minimum income 
requirement	 to	qualify	 for	home	financing.	 In	 our	models,	we	 assume	 that	 any	
household	can	move	from	top	of	the	distribution	to	its	bottom	and	vice	versa.	But,	in	
reality, income mobility is very lengthy and slow process. Therefore, reconsidering 
income mobility and imposing some lower bounds on the income level for home 
financing	qualification	as	actually	practiced	by	bankers	could	be	more	realistic.	
The models can also be enhanced by adding more fundamental variables 
related to the demand and supply of housing. Economic aspects of housing rather 
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than	its	financing	aspects	could	be	more	important	in	price	discovery.	Inclusion	
of household income as only the fundamental variable could be considered as 
oversimplifying assumption. Inclusion of other fundamental variables, such as 
cost	of	production	and	down-payment	requirements	can	make	the	results	more	
robust and reliable. 
Finally, based on our previous suggestion of including more fundamental 
variables, a more realistic simulation of the model could be conducted by using 
actual historical data. As one alternative, house prices for a group of counties can 
be simulated using available historical data on income, rental, construction cost 
and other relevant variables. The resulting outcome under the proposed EMM 
model	can	be	tested	and	compared	to	those	from	the	Conventional	home	financing.	
VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Interest	 based	 financial	 system	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 the	 culprit	 behind	 the	 2007-
2008	Subprime	Crisis.	Many	economies	of	 the	world	are	 still	 suffering	 from	 the	
consequences of the crisis. This event has reopened grounds for consideration of 
other	financing	alternatives	as	a	solution	for	ill-ridden	conventional	system.	Because	
of	its	rapid	development	and	persistent	returns,	Islamic	finance	has	emerged	as	a	
viable	alternative.	Many	researchers	argue	in	favor	of	the	Islamic	finance	as	being	
more	efficient	and	resilient	in	times	of	economic	and	financial	turmoil.	Among	many	
justifications	of	this	argument,	the	Islamic	finance’s	closer	ties	to	the	real	sector	of	
economy	and	the	profit	and	loss	sharing	principle	are	oft-cited.	Unfortunately,	the	
lack	of	 in-depth	 theoretical	 research	especially	 in	 Islamic	home	financing	 leaves	
those	arguments	as	unproven	hypotheses	or	even	as	mere	conjectures.
In this work, we make a humble contribution in this area of research by 
comparing the impacts that an PLS based Musharakah Mutanaqisah (EMM) 
home	financing	 and	 conventional	housing	 loan	have	on	 real	 estate	prices.	Two	
alternative	 rational	 expectation	based	multi-period	profit	maximization	models	
are formulated and simulated. The simulation results have provided support 
for	 the	 comparative	 advantage	 of	 EMM	 home	 financing	 over	 its	 conventional	
counterpart. 
There are some important implications obtained from the above analysis. 
Most	notably,	the	application	of	the	EMM	home	financing	results	 in	substantial	
smoothening	of	the	RE	cycle	and	contributes	to	reduction	in	house	price	inflation,	
when compared to the conventional model. Consequently, the probability of real 
estate	bubble	formation	is	substantially	less	under	the	EMM	setting.	Such	effect	
can	be	explained	by	the	profit	and	loss	sharing	nature	of	the	EMM	home	financing	
model.	Furthermore,	the	drop	in	the	amount	of	home	financing	under	the	EMM	
setting	coupled	with	the	increased	risk	sharing	responsibility	of	the	bank	may	also	
suggest	 that	 the	 adverse	 selection	 problem	 could	 significantly	 reduce.	 Despite	
some simplifying assumptions used in the models, the practical implications 
drawn from their outcomes are still valid. The robustness of the simulation results 
under	the	EMM	setting	is	further	confirmed	after	relaxing	our	assumptions	about	
constancy	of	rental	payments	as	well	as	financing	costs.	
In	summary,	this	paper	has	offered	a	theoretical	proof	in	support	of	Islamic	
finance’s	 resilience	 to	 economic	 shocks	 and	 its	 countercyclical	 nature.	 More	
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specifically,	 it	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 benefit	 of	 a	 true	 PLS	 based	 Islamic	
finance	product	to	the	economy	can	be	considerable,	unlike	the	conventional	case.	
Another	indirect	implication	of	our	finding	is	that,	for	more	efficient	functioning	
of	an	Islamic	finance	product,	it	should	be	Shari’ah	complaint	not	only	in	form	but	
in substance as well. Therefore, as the most important policy recommendation for 
those	authorities	who	are	considering	adoption	of	 Islamic	financing	alternative,	
we would suggest ensuring the existence of PLS feature in the products being 
considered and the full application of such features in practice such that their 
economic	benefits	can	be	fully	materialized.	
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